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A decline in labour force and wage cuts are among the factors that determine macroeconomic trends. Since 
workers are normally motivated by signifi cantly higher wages in other companies, these factors can reduce 
labour mobility.  Moreover, we are witnessing trends related to the share of labour force, capital and output 
growth. Th is paper supports the thesis according to which these trends are rooted in the increase of the 
market power starting from the 1980s.
Furthermore, this paper analyses the development of the margins using the company-level data in the USA 
economy from the1950s on. Initially, the margins were stable, or on a slight decline. Average margins had 
an increase of 18% above the marginal cost in the 1980s compared to the 67% growth that we are witness-
ing nowadays. Th ere seems to be no clear pattern identifi able across the industries, but the margins tend 
to be higher in smaller companies in all industries and the higher growth is usually registered as a result of 
growth within an industry. 
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 In the following sections we will point to a con-
nection between the market power and a couple of 
trends observable in the aforementioned period of 
time.
A market force can be defi ned in more familiar 
terms such as margins. Even though the equality 
of the terms is quite disputable, let us assume they 
are identical, to facilitate the understanding. Based 
on company-level data in the period 1950-1980 the 
level of margins/market power was more or less 
constant. However, from the 1980s to the present 
day there has been a steady increase in the market 
force, from 18% above cost to 67% above cost, which 
means an increase in the price level in relation to 
the cost of 1% per annum. Secondly, by studying 
the macroeconomic implications of an increase in 
the market power we gain an understanding of its 
eff ects and consequences on the overall balance as 
well (Baily, Bosworth, 2014).
Margins are usually estimated based on assump-
tions about the consumer behaviour combined with 
profi t maximizing and a projected model of how 
companies compete, for instance the Bertrand-
Nash model of pricing.
Th e main problem that this approach encounters is 
the fact that marginal costs of production are not 
constant, which makes it harder to extract them 
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from the data available. Th us, the optimum pric-
ing connects data on prices observed with the esti-
mated elasticity of the substitute in order to get to 
the marginal cost of production and margins them-
selves. Th e combination of the need for consumer 
demand data (containing prices, amounts, proper-
ties, consumer characteristics etc.) and the need to 
establish a behavioural model has limited to usage 
of the so-called access to the demand on specifi c 
markets (Baqaee, Farhi, 2017).
Th is paper follows a radically diff erent approach to 
margin estimating, the so-called production-orient-
ed approach, taking into account the latest advances 
in the literature on margin estimating in the work of 
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). What makes the 
De Loecker and Scott approach unique is the fact 
that it relies on the data on input and output of par-
ticular enterprises taking into account an observed 
group of consumers in a certain time period, and 
presupposes a cost minimization by the manufac-
turer. Margins are calculated for each manufacturer 
in a certain time period, as well as the diff erence be-
tween the share of variable revenue input in revenue 
(observable in the data) and the elasticity of produc-
tion. Th e latter is estimated in association with pro-
duction functions (Jovanovic, 1982). Th e advantage 
of this approach is that it can be referenced to pub-
licly available sources providing the data on produc-
tion. Even though there are still problems regard-
ing the estimation and the subsequent econometric 
challenges, there seems to be no alternative way to 
progress (De Loecker, Scott, 2016). Th is method 
makes it possible to discover the main pattern in 
market power over the course of a longer period 
and within the global economy.
Th is analysis is interesting and very signifi cant on 
its own given the fact that the economic models are 
allowing for substantial variations of margins in re-
lation to manufacturers and time, and by allowing 
such variations of company/time it implies a whole 
range of signifi cant questions on diff erent issues.
After we determine the principal facts, we take 
them as the assumption on basis of which we then 
discuss the implications of the growth of the market 
power forming the latest discussions in macroeco-
nomics/work literature. Margin growth is taken as 
a given fact and we do not go into the analysis of 
how it takes place, which is something that could 
be dealt with in a separate paper, even though we 
do provide the reader with a couple of promising 
explanations in the concluding remarks. We are 
paying special attention to how the margin growth 
naturally leads to a decrease in the share of the 
workforce and the share of capital, wage cuts for the 
low-qualifi ed, and the overall reduction of labour 
force (Hyatt, Spletzer, 2013), as well as reduction in 
work fl ows and interstate migration. Finally, we are 
able to demonstrate that a valid explanation of mar-
ginal growth does not involve a decrease in produc-
tivity, but rather the opposite, despite the fact that 
the output growth is slowed down.
2. Margin estimation
It is a general fact that margin estimation is a dif-
fi cult task because the data on marginal costs, espe-
cially on pricing on a large representative sample is 
not easily accessible. 
We rely on the recently proposed framework by 
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), based on Hall’s 
idea (1988) about margin estimation (on a com-
pany level) using standard data on companies from 
balance sheets, which does not require creation of 
assumptions on demand and mode of market com-
petitiveness. Instead, margins are calculated using 
minimizing the cost of variable input of production. 
Th is approach calls for explicit use of the produc-
tion function.
 2.1 Behaviour of manufacturers
 Let us imagine an economy with N number of en-
terprises, with the index i = 1,...,N. Enterprises are 
heterogeneous in their productivity and have access 
to a joint manufacturing technology. In any time pe-
riod z, enterprise m reduces simultaneous produc-
tion costs taking into account the production func-
tion that transforms inputs in the amount of output 
Q
mz
 produced by technology O(·):
Where P =(PM,..., PJ) is a set of variable inputs of pro-
duction (including work, intermediary input, materi-
als...), I
mz
 is the basic capital and Ω
mz
 is Hicks’ neutral 
productive member specifi c to an enterprise. Since 
we are about to use information on the set of vari-
able inputs rather than individual inputs, in the ex-
position, the vector P is treated as scalar P. Following 
De Loecker and Warzynsky (2012) we observe La-
grange’s objective function connected to it: 
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Where CP is the price of variable input, t is the cost 
of ownership of the capital, O( ) is the technology 
(1), O
mz
 is scalar, and Λ
mz
 is Lagrange’s multiplier. 
We are considering the fi rst order condition in rela-
tion to variable input P, in the following way: 





forming the equation, we get to the form of elastic-
ity of production for input P:
Lagra nge’s parameter Λ is a direct measure of mar-
ginal cost, that is, the value of an objective function 
while we allow the limitations of the output. We de-
fi ne margin as , whereas the product price is 
C, which depends on the extent of market power. In 
further text we come back to that again. By replacing 
the marginal cost with the relation between margins 
and prices, we get a simple formula for margin:
Th e formula for margin is derived without determin-
ing the behaviour and/or particular demand system. 
It should be noted that with this approach to margin 
estimation, there are, in theory, several fi rst-order 
conditions (from each variable input in production) 
that provide a formula for the margin. Regardless 
of which variable input is being used, there are two 
key factors required to estimate the margin: the vari-
able input share  and elasticity of produc-
tion of variable input  . Even though this ap-
proach does not limit the elasticity of production, 
in the implementation of this procedure consistent 
estimation of elasticity from the data depends on 
the specifi c production function and assumptions 
on the consumer behaviour. In further text we deal 
with the implementation.
2.2 Implementation
We observe the sales directly , as well 
as total variable costs of production , 
measured on the basis of the cost of a sold product. 
Compustat data do not show directly an overview of 
expenses for variable input such as labour, interme-
diary input, electricity etc., so we are more inclined 
to rely on the registered total variable expenses of 
production. Calculation of margins requires an 
estimation of elasticity of production of this set of 
input. We follow the standard practice relying on 
a group of companies estimating their production 
functions by industry. We pay special attention to 
diff erent production function specifi cations, on 
the economy level, but also on the industrial level. 
When it comes to end results, we take into consid-
eration Cobb-Douglas production functions for a 
specifi c industry, with variable input and capital.
When it comes to particular industries, the produc-
tion function is observed in the following way: 





, and where q
mz
 is measured as a logarithm 
of reduced sales of a company. We are considering 
literature and control of the bias when it comes to 
selection and simultaneity, which is inherently pre-
sent in the estimation of the equation above and we 
rely on the control function approach paired with 
the AR(1) productivity process in order to esti-
mate the elasticity of production of variable input, 
marked here as β
p
 (Antras, 2004). Th e main char-
acteristic of this kind of approach, in the context of 
our research, is that the control function approach 
rests on the equation of optimum input demand; 
which is an immediate eff ect in the cost minimi-
zation used to formulate margin expression. More 
importantly, Olley and Pakes (1996) have concluded 
that the (unobserved) ω
mz
 productive member is ob-
tained by the function of the enterprise input and 
control variable, which, in our case, corresponds to 
the set of variable input, making ω
mz
 = h (pmz, imz).
Th is approach is based on the so-called two-fold 
access, and during the fi rst phase of measurement 
errors and unexpected shocks of sales are removed 
in the following way:
where ϕ = β
p




). Process of 
productivity is obtained in the following way: 
, and this leads to the following 
state of the moment of formulating the elasticity of 
production for a particular industry:
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) to its delay , where pro-
ductivity is obtained , using ϕ 
estimation from the fi rst phase of sale regression on 
nonparametric function of variable input, capital 
and annual indicator variables. Th is approach iden-
tifi es the elasticity of production of variable input 
under the assumption that the deployment of vari-
able input responds to shocks of production, but 
that the lagged values do not correspond, and, more 
importantly, that deploying the lagged variable of 
input correlates with deployment of a current input 
variable, which is guaranteed by productivity per-
sistence.
We measure the margins on an enterprise level us-
ing the estimations of elasticity of production.
As discussed in the work of De Loecker and Warzy-
inski (2012), we have corrected margin estimations 
in relation to the presence of a measurement error 
in sales , obtained in the fi rst phase of regres-
sion.
3. Macroeconomic implications
We analyse the macroeconomic implications of the 
growth of market power. Some implications call for 
further data analysis (Barkai, 2017)1, data used in 
margin calculations, and as far as other implications 
are concerned we have developed a simple static 
model of competitiveness in the industry in order 
to illustrate how market power can generate notable 
outcomes.
More precisely, we will briefl y sum up the heteroge-
neities observable from the data.
Implication 1. Secular decline of the labour force
In national accounts, the share of the workforce in 
the income determines the expenditures (wages) 
divided by total generated income. Even though 
there is fl uctuation in business cycles, the work-
force share was notably stable since World War II 
till the eighties, approximately 62%. From 1980 on 
there has been a secular decline to 56%. Th e decline 
is observable in most industries and in diff erent 
countries (see Karabarbounis, Neiman, 2014; Gol-
lin, 2002).
Economists did not come up with convincing evi-
dence of a mechanism for reduction of the work-
force share (Noe et al., 2014). Th ere are, however, 
several explanations. Karabarbounis and Neiman 
(2014) assume that a great deal of decline can be ex-
plained by reduction in relative prices of investment 
goods due to information technology. An alterna-
tive explanation would be the composition of pro-
duction and services. Production usually requires a 
larger part of the workforce than services (Acemo-
glu, 2010; Ziliboti, 2001); therefore, it is only natural 
that the labour force will drop with a shift occurring 
when industry is switching from production to ser-
vices. However, this switch does not coincide with 
the period of decline of the workforce. As a matter 
of fact, the largest part of the transition from pro-
duction to services took place before the 1980s (be-
tween 1950 and 1987 the share of production in the 
output has dropped from more than two thirds to 
less than a half, whereas the service sector has dou-
bled, from 21% to 40%, but that transition has been 
slowing down since 1987, see Armenter (2015).
Zheng et al. (2017) off er another explanation based 
on the greater importance of immaterial capital and 
its incomplete measurements as a part of capital in 
aggregate data. Enterprises now invest much more 
into intellectual property products, which leads to 
lower production cost. However, in their world of 
perfect competition, this measurement problem 
should not lead to an increase of the total profi t 
share. As we have stated previously, a fourfold in-
crease of the total profi t rate points to the fact that 
immaterial possessions play an increasingly impor-
tant role. Th ey have to enable enterprises to use as 
much market power as possible, which is the central 
thesis of our paper. Finally, Elsby et al. (2013) pro-
vide no evidence that capital is being replaced by 
workforce, nor that the explanation lies in the de-
cline of the trade union. Th ey do provide evidence 
for the off -shore hard work as an explanation.
In the context of our thesis, margin change has an 
immediate implication for the share of the labour 
force. Having calculated the margins with the help 
of all variable inputs, we can do the same for the 
work itself. Th erefore, we shall, starting from the 
fi rst order condition (5) discover that on the enter-
prise level, the labour force share  satisfi es:
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where θ
R
 is the elasticity of production in relation 
to labour. Profi t maximizing in individual enter-
prises implies a reverse proportional change of the 
labour force share. As the margin grows, and on 
condition that the technology parameter θ remains 
unchanged over time, we expect a reduction of the 
workforce share. 
Unfortunately, Compustat does not have quality 
data when it comes to wages. Hence, we cannot di-
rectly check the condition on an enterprise level. In-
stead, we rely on the aggregate data from BLS. Th ey 
publish the total employee compensation (wage ex-
penditures) as a part of gross domestic income. We 
compare these BLS measurements with the average 
population from the right side of the equation (1), 
assuming that the technology parameter has re-
mained unchanged. 
As a margin value we use the one calculated on 
the basis of total variable costs (COGS), and not 
the work cost because we lack reliable data on the 
wages. Th is is shown in Figure 1, in which we have 
normalized these values on 100 at the beginning of 
our data in 1950 (Harberger, 1954).
Our main conclusion is that the labour force share 
(in green) closely follows the reverse margin, espe-
cially since 1980. It seems that the workforce share 
has been going through a slower decline than the 
reversed average margin, but the trend is very simi-
lar. Th e fact that this aggregate measurement of the 
workforce follows the reversed margin is quite out-
standing because we are implicitly making these as-
sumptions, due to a lack of data on the wages on an 
enterprise level (Th ompson et al., 2008).
Figure 1 Evolution of the workforce share (BLS) and reversed margin (1960-2014) 
Notes: Data on the labour force from BLS. Share in the gross domestic income: Employee benefi ts, paid: Salary calculati-
on. Payments, people. 1950 = 100.
Source: De Locker, J. (2017), “Th e Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications”
In theory, all workers were treated as equals in a 
company given the fact that we only had one mar-
gin measurement per company and that our model 
assumes that workload is adjusted only to the num-
ber of employees, and not the composition (Hig-
gins, 2014; Higgins, 2007; Higgins, Cohen, 2007). 
Moreover, margin μ
m
 in each company is calculated 
on the basis of all variable inputs (work inputs R 
and material inputs U) where the fi rst order con-
dition (18) should apply to margin calculated only 
in relation to work. Th e bond between reduction of 
the workforce and the growth of (aggregate) market 
power is robust according to specifi c weights used 
to formulate aggregate margin index (Moll, 2014).
Implication 2 Secular decline of capital
Th e logic for the decline of the workforce applies to 
material U, that is, variable inputs used in produc-
tion. Th ese are included into our measurement of 
the variable cost of COGS. By taking into account 
the evolution of capital investments, which is not 
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included in our measurements of variable expenses 
and which is adjusted on a lower and longer-term 
frequency than the margin growth, there are im-
plications for the capital share. While there is a 
lot of discussion on the reduction of the labour 
force share, the reduction of capital has been paid 
much less attention. Using a simple accounting 
rule, we can formulate the sales of a company as: 
, where t is the cost of ownership 
of fi xed capital and A is the total profi t.
Figure 2 Evolution of capital (our calculations) and the reversed margin (weighted by sales share) 
(1980-2014) 
Notes: Data on equity, personal calculations (from Compustat). Gross capital (PPEGT) adjusted to the Input Price 
Defl ator (PIRIC from FRED), federal funds rate and exogenous deprecation rate of 12%. 1980=100
Source: De Locker, J. (2017), “Th e Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications”
Even if the equity is not a djusted on an annual 
basis, on average, over a long period of time, the 
cost of capital ownership tI as a part of the out-
put will develop. If the market power and profi t 
grow, companies not only reduce the labour force 
share but, over a long period of time, reduce the 
capital too . Whenever the capital is adjustable, 
maybe over a span of a couple of years only, it will 
be done in accordance with the fi rst order condi-
tion . Th en we can formulate the following:
where we bring together all variable inputs into P 










 = 1 and where  stands for a total profit 
rate.
Implication 3 Secular decline of the low-qualifi ed 
labour force
For the following four implications – decline in 
wages of low-qualifi ed labour force, decline of the 
labour force share as well as reduction in the work 
and migration fl ows – we later describe the model 
used in order to estimate margins. In other words, 
margin estimation and the key facts related to it and 
its implications are founded only on cost minimiza-
tion, whereas additional assumptions on the market 
structure, consumer behaviour and demand only 
refl ect that (Arrow et al., 1961).
Let’s assume there is a measure l of the market, 
and each includes N companies. Each market is 
marked as Ω, which points to a level of produc-
tivity of each company on the market. Companies 
are equally productive within each market. In the 
general economy, the distribution Ω is F(Ω). In the 
general economy there is a measure M for unskilled 
workers. Workers are indexed by qualifi cation z 
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expressed in the units of effi  ciency and allocated 
according to G(z). All workers share a common ex-
ternal ability U. Labour market is competitive and a 
balanced wage is marked as w.
Due to a fi nal number of companies on a particular 
market, each company has a certain market power, 
hence, according to Bresnahan (1982) we formulate 
the behaviour in determining the price of limit cost 
in terms of “behaviour parameter”. With regard to 
marginal cost c, the decision on pricing on the mar-
ket Ω is:
Where Om output of a company m,  O = Σ
m
, Om 
functions as market output, and  dis-
plays some of the characteristics of the elasticity of 
production. In the case of linear demand C (O) = a 
– bO, for instance, h(O) = bO. Term λ is the behav-
iour parameter, which measures the market struc-
ture. For instance, in Cournot’s model, λ equals the 
reverse number of companies N on the market. In 
perfect competitiveness, as N proceeds to infi nity, 
so λ drops to zero, and in monopoly, if N = 1, then 
λ = 1. It can also measure the extent of consumers’ 
loyalty (Burdett, Judd, 1983).
Our margin  measure can be formulated as:
Th is makes the possible reason of margin growth 
highly transparent. Firstly, if a company increases 
its productivity (reducing the marginal cost t), and 
other companies do not do the same, then margins 
increase due to higher effi  ciency. Th is cannot be a 
long-term outcome, however, because the other 
companies will adapt to the technology. Secondly, 
if the elasticity of demand decreases, this is formu-
lated by an increase in g(O). Th irdly, if the behaviour 
parameter λ increases, market power of a company 
grows, and the margins follow. Although factors 
listed could all be the cause of margin growth, we 
will be focusing on the change in parameter λ in or-
der to refl ect the noted growth of parameter μ. Re-
duction of parameter t in any given company should 
lead to the same trend in other companies, either 
because they are also embracing new, cheaper tech-
nology or because they are being pushed out of the 
market. Naturally, preferences (and with them even 
h) can transform and change, but it is quite unimag-
inable that they would change so dramatically as to 
match the growth of the market power in a period 
of a couple of decades.
Th e company goal is to select an amount of work R
i
 
to maximize the profi t:
where . Th en the fi rst order condition 
refl  ects the market structure, and, in accordance 
with the rules of conduct satisfi es C(O) — λh(O) = 
t where  is a marginal cost. Th en 
where . In the case of Cournot’s 
model of linear demand P = a — bO, and, when it 
comes to similar companies, the fi rst order condi-
tion (FOC) (24) can be formulated as: 





and , and the condition of balance is: 
which implies that R is decreasing into λ, and Rm is 
increasing into λ:
Th is brings us to the following scheme:
Scheme 1: For a certain salary and a certain mar-
ket Ω, the demand for labour force on market R 
decreases in market power λ; demand for labour 
force in the individual company Rm grows in mar-
ket power λ.
Th is result points to the fact that the demand for 
labour force is turning inwards as λ grows. 
Because of market power, total demand for labour 
force R is lower as the company limits the produc-
tion. However, the market power lies in the fact that 
there are fewer companies  out there. Th us, 
even though the labour force demand is smaller 
(just like the output), each company has a higher 
stake at the market and has a higher output, and 
requires a larger labour force (Wright et al., 2014).
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Figure 3 Workforce demand, workforce available and balance for λ = 0 (perfect competitiveness) and 
λ = 1 (monopoly). Parameters Ω = 1, θ = 1 meaning that Q = R
 
 
Source: Liu, X., Van Jaarsveld, D. D., Batt, R., Frost, A. C. (2014), “Th e infl uence of capital structure on strategic human capital”
Total labour force demand RD is shown by labour 
force demand in each market Ω:
 Scheme 1
where the labour force demand is in decline .
Scheme 1 implies that the increase of parameter λ 
leads to a change in labour force demand RD in-
wards.
Now we turn to the available labour force. Since the 
external possibility is fi xed, any qualifi ed worker č 
will want to work as long as čw > Š. Th us, the mar-
ginal low-qualifi ed worker z* is indiff erent whether 
he works or not: 
Total available workforce RS(w) is then:
where the latter equality follows in the case where G is 
equal. It should be noted that the available labour force 
grows upwardly in w, as long as G is unregenerated:
where g(č) is the density G(č).
Balance on this competitive labour market equals 
the available workforce and demand for a labour 
force:
With the available labour force growing upwardly 
and a shift in labour force demand declining as λ 
grows, we can occlude the following.
Proposition 1
Let us consider an economy with a constant propor-
tional return. Th an the balanced (nominal and real) 
wages w* and a balanced labour force R* are declin-
ing in market power λ.
We graphically illustrate the result in Figure 3 in 
case in which λ = 0 i λ = 1. Th e general case is shown 
in the Appendix.
It should be noted that the nominal wage w* is lower 
for higher market power λ. However, the real wag-
es are even lower, with regard to the fact that the 
actual wages are represented by s  . In a perfect 
competitiveness real wages are 1 (w* = C*) where 
under the market power we have . 
Even with a perfectly elastic labour force, where the 
nominal wages are constant, the real wages are in 
decline in market power. In order to observe the 
trend, take a look at the case of a perfectly elastic 
labour force. When w = Š, and s θ = 1 i Ω = 1, real 
wages are displayed as: 
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Figure 4 Evolution of the wages’ median (1980-2016) Data from FRED, CPS. (a) median of wages (on a 
weekly basis, prices from 1982) (b) the ratio of median wages and GDP per capita
Source: De Locker, J. (2017), “Th e Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications”
Trivially, real wages are in decline in market power 
λ. Wage is constant and the prices are growing:
Now we can connect these theoretical discoveries 
with empirical evidence of the next two implications 
of the market power growth (Decker et al., 2014)2 
Th ere is vast evidence on stagnation of low wages in 
the last couple of decades consistent with the fi nd-
ings in result 1. Figure 4a graphically illustrates the 
median of weekly wages in unchanged price values 
from 1982. Th ere was little or no change of the me-
dian of wages from 1980s. In the presence of eco-
nomic growth, it means that the share of the median 
of wages in GDP per capita has decreased. Figure 4b 
illustrates the relation of wage medians to GDP per 
capita. Th ere has been a secular decline in ratio of 
1.3 in 1980 to 0.75 at present day.
Th is is not just a matter of how distribution of earn-
ings spreads during a life cycle (Guvenen et al., 2017).
Implication 4 Secular decline of the labour force share
Figure 5 illustrates the rate of the workforce share 
in the economy of the USA since 1950. We witness 
a strong decline from the mid-1990s. It seems that 
the trend does not coincide with the moment of 
market power growth. However, a sudden upheaval 
of the labour force from the sixties on was caused 
by a greater share of women on the labour market, 
which brought about a change in the available la-
bour force. Th is trend was stabilized in the mid-
nineties, which is consistent with the fact that we 
only start noticing the decline of a total share of the 
labour force due to growth in market power. 
Figure 5 Total labour force share, (1950-2016) Data from FRED, CPS
Source: De Locker, J. (2017), “Th e Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications”
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4. Conclusion
Using micro data on the US public limited liability 
companies since 1980 we have demonstrated that 
the margins were relatively constant, around 20% 
above the marginal cost. From 1980 to 2014 there 
were signifi cant changes of the pattern, with mar-
gins displaying a steady growth, from 18% to almost 
67% in 2014, which is an increase of three and a half 
times.
We have documented the properties of this growth, 
which is a consequence of changes within the in-
dustry easily brought down to margin growth of 
companies with the highest margins. Margins are 
usually higher in smaller companies, but it seems to 
be a result of the eff ects of composition in all in-
dustries because it disappears when we deconstruct 
the margin on a specifi c-industry level (Bernard et 
al., 2003).
We use this growth to study implications it had on 
secular macroeconomic trends over the last dec-
ades: 1) reduction of workforce share, 2) reduction 
of equity, 3) wage cuts for the low-qualifi ed work-
force, 4) reduction of labour force, 5) reduction of 
labour force fl ows, 6) reduction of the migration 
rate, 7) slower output and GDP (Eeckhout, Weng, 
2017; Foster et al., 2008).
Naturally, there are other secular trends coincid-
ing with the market power growth: 1) reduction of 
the rate of new companies due to major obstacles 
that have been raised by existing companies; 2) re-
duction of long-term interest rates due to a decline 
of the demand for capital (as a result of reduced 
amounts for companies with market power) and 
increased capital supply (due to higher profi t); 3) 
increased wage inequality, wage cuts for the low-
qualifi ed workers, as stated above, together with an 
increase in wages of the qualifi ed workforce due to 
profi t sharing; 4) great moderation, or a belief that 
the output fl uctuation has fallen since 1980 (Gu-
venen et al., 2017), has lost its appeal following the 
great recession, but continues to be highly promi-
nent in data, especially in the last decade, naturally, 
with the exception of the year 2008.
Th ere are two exceptional political consequences 
stemming from the market power growth (De 
Locker, 2011; De Locker et al., 2016). Th e fi rst one 
is infl ation. Compared to a scenario without market 
power growth and with the same technology devel-
opment, prices would be going up by 1% on an an-
nual basis (42% over 35 years, from 1.18 to 1.67). 
Th is implies that the infl ation was higher than it 
would have been without the market power growth. 
Th is is really surprising, taking into consideration 
the low rates of infl ation in a couple of last decades, 
and especially low rates since the great recession. Of 
course, monetary policy is not an appropriate tool 
to remove infl ation. Th at would be the exclusive 
right of antitrust policy.
Another consequence is connected to the value of 
the stock market. Stock prices refl ect a disrupted 
fl ow of dividends and profi ts. Th us, the stock mar-
ket under market power is overestimated in relation 
to a competitive economy. If investors believe that 
the current profi t rate, which is four times higher 
than the one in 1980, is permanent, than it could be 
expected that the capitalization of the stock mar-
ket would be four times higher than the one under 
perfect competitiveness (Colard-Wexler, De Locker, 
2016; Davis, Kahn, 2008).
Th at would place the Dow Jones index on the 5,500 
point level instead of its present value of almost 
22,000. It is a naive calculation because market capi-
talization also refl ects a great margin, total value of 
sold goods, which decreases with the market power. 
How great the eff ect of market power is on the stock 
market value depends on the elasticity of demand.
We should keep in mind that even the stock market 
can grow if the output is gone, for instance, when 
productivity growth is zero, and the market power 
and with it the profi t increases. In the presence of 
market power, the stock market is not a valid indica-
tor of economic output (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Margins are multiplying faster than ever, at least 
since World War II when our data begins. Th e ques-
tion to be answered is if the trend will continue, but 
for now, we have no indications that margins might 
start declining soon.
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Zoran Miletić
Nikolina Plazonić
UTJECAJ LJUDSKOG KAPITALA I PROMJENE 
TRŽIŠNE SNAGE NA TRENDOVE U EKONOMIJI 
Sažetak
Činjenice koje određuju makroekonomske trendove su smanjenje radne snage i smanjenje plaća, a neki 
trendovi rezultiraju smanjenom mobilnošću radne snage, obično motiviranim znatno višim plaćama u dru-
gim poduzećima. Nadalje, svjedoci smo trendova koji se odnose na udio radne snage, kapitala i rasta proi-
zvodnje. Ovaj rad podupire tezu prema kojoj su ti trendovi ukorijenjeni u povećanju tržišne snage počevši 
od 1980.
Nadalje, ovaj rad analizira razvoj marži korištenjem podataka na razini poduzeća u gospodarstvu SAD-a od 
1950. godine. U početku, marže su bile stabilne ili u laganom padu. Prosječne su marže prošle porast od 18% 
iznad graničnih troškova u osamdesetim godinama do 67% rasta koji danas vidimo. Čini se da nema jasnog 
uzorka koji se može identifi cirati u svim industrijama, ali marže imaju tendenciju da budu više u manjim 
poduzećima u svim industrijama, a veći rast obično se bilježi kao rezultat rasta unutar industrije. 
Ključne riječi: marže, makroekonomska kretanja, tržišna snaga 
